Introduction
Paranoia involves the belief that harm is occurring or will occur and that a perceived persecutor is deliberately trying to cause harm (Freeman & Garety, 2000) . It is considered a complex multidimensional phenomenon involving a continuum from normal human experience to persecutory delusions at the extreme end (e.g., Freeman et al., 2005; Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004) . Selfesteem has been implicated in a number of prominent theories of the development and maintenance of paranoia, and there is some evidence in this regard. For example, individuals diagnosed with persecutory delusions, as well as those with paranoia-proneness, are characterized by low and fluctuating self-esteem (Kesting & Lincoln, 2013; Tiernan, Tracey, & Shannon, 2014) . Furthermore, there is evidence that reduced self-esteem precedes increases in state paranoia (e.g., Thewissen, Bentall, Lecomte, van Os, & MyinGermeys, 2008) . To account for this relationship, Bentall, Kinderman, and Kaney (1994); Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, and Kinderman (2001) proposed that individuals with paranoia attribute negative events externally and personally in order to preserve self-esteem. In contrast, Freeman and colleagues argued that paranoid beliefs directly reflect emotional concerns and negative self-concepts (e.g., self as vulnerable; Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002; Freeman & Garety, 2014) .
A number of researchers have investigated the relationship between paranoia and self-esteem in non-clinical samples by examining the putative role of social exclusion induced through a virtual ball toss game ('Cyberball'; Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000) , in which participants are either included or excluded by other (computer-generated) 'players' (e.g., Kesting, Bredenpohl, Klenke, Westermann, & Lincoln, 2013; Lincoln, Stahnke, & Moritz, 2014; Westermann, Kesting, & Lincoln, 2012) . For example, Kesting et al. (2013) found that excluded participants reported an increase in sub-clinical paranoia, which was mediated by a decrease in self-esteem and moderated by paranoia-proneness. These findings suggest that the experimental induction of social stress, as in Cyberball, may be useful in studying possible relationships among aversive interpersonal experiences, paranoia, and self-esteem by allowing us to investigate the potential causal role of adverse social events on paranoia, self-esteem, and the relationship between them.
Measuring self-esteem
Several factors should be considered when measuring selfesteem in the experimental induction of social stress. First, while much previous research has focused on global self-esteem (see Kesting & Lincoln, 2013) , Barrowclough et al. (2003) emphasized the distinction between positive and negative components because "individuals may hold both strong positive and strong negative views about the self at the same time, with the two dimensions not only making independent contributions to global self-esteem, but also making separate contributions to behavior and affect" (p. 93). Indeed, the review by Kesting and Lincoln indicated that both persecutory delusions in clinical samples and paranoid ideation in the general population are associated with specific negative selfevaluations; while positive self-evaluations are maintained, or are at least less impaired, in clinical samples. To date, only global selfesteem, rather than positive and negative self-evaluations, has been investigated using Cyberball.
Second, self-report methods rely on an individual's ability to access their feelings and on their willingness to report them (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Ross & Nisbett, 1991) , and thus are susceptible to response biases (e.g., self-presentation), particularly on socially or personally sensitive topics (see Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009) . Measuring 'automatic' or 'implicit' cognitions may help circumvent such biases (see Greenwald et al., 2002) . This can be achieved using implicit measures, such as the Implicit Association Task (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) that place participants under time pressure and therein capture 'automatic' responding.
Implicit self-esteem
The widely used 'self-esteem IAT' (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) assesses the relative strength of associations of two contrasted construct categories (e.g., 'Me' versus 'Others') with two contrasted attribute categories (e.g., 'Positive' versus 'Negative'). Participants are required to respond as quickly as possible in accordance with two separate construct-attribute associations by mapping one of each onto the same response keys. On one block of trials, participants are required to categorize 'Me' with 'Positive' and 'Others' with 'Negative' (hypothesized as 'consistent' with a typical learning history). On an alternative block of trials, participants must categorize 'Me' with 'Negative' and 'Others' with 'Positive' ('inconsistent' with typical learning). Faster responding on consistent ('Me' with 'positive') than inconsistent ('Me' with 'negative') blocks indicates positive implicit self-esteem.
Despite its widespread use, the IAT has limitations, especially as a measure of implicit self-esteem. First, it juxtaposes self and others as contrast categories, thus rendering it impossible to explore selfbased associations independently (Karpinski, 2004; although see Pinter & Greenwald, 2005) . Thus, the effect obtained does not specify whether the stronger self-positive association represents a 'Me-Positive' bias, an 'Others-Negative' bias, or some combination of these. Second, the IAT does not capture the nature of an association (e.g., 'Me-Positive' could in principle be 'Me'-same as-'Positive' or 'Me'-opposite to-'Positive') and thus can only be deemed an indirect measure of potential underlying self-evaluations.
The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; BarnesHolmes et al., 2006) is an alternative measure that may offer some advantages over the IAT. The IRAP is based on a modern behavioral account of human language and cognition called Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001), which argues that the core functional units of language are relational. Thus, the IRAP focuses on specific relations (e.g., opposition, or comparison) between stimuli, rather than associations (see Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & DeHouwer, 2011; Hughes, BarnesHolmes, & Vahey, 2012). While the IAT and IRAP both require participants to respond quickly and accurately in ways deemed consistent or inconsistent with their previous learning histories, the format of IRAP trials is different from the IAT. Consider the following 'self-esteem' IRAP, for example. On each trial, one of two label stimuli (e.g., 'Me', 'Others') is presented top-screen with, for example, either a positive (e.g., 'good', 'friendly') or negative (e.g., 'bad', 'rejected') target stimulus presented center-screen. Participants must then choose one of two response options (e.g., 'Similar', 'Opposite') presented left and right bottom-screen. Hence, responding on consistent trials might involve selecting 'Me-Positive-Similar', while responding on inconsistent trials might involve selecting 'Me-Positive-Opposite'. This format generates four individual trial-types which are considered four metrics of the individual relational responses that comprise a self-esteem bias ('MePositive', 'Me-Negative', 'Others-Positive', 'Others-Negative'), unlike the IAT's single metric. This enhanced specificity may be useful in distinguishing between the positive and negative selfevaluations in global self-esteem.
The IRAP has been increasingly used in experimental-clinical research and has provided some important insights (see Vahey, Nicholson, & Barnes-Holmes, 2015, for a meta-analysis). For example, Remue, DeHouwer, Barnes-Holmes, Vanderhasselt, and De Raedt (2013) found that individuals with self-reported dysphoria had lower actual self-esteem and higher ideal selfesteem than controls. Such research highlights the utility of the IRAP in parsing out how self-concepts may be related to clinicallyrelevant phenomena. Furthermore, some studies have demonstrated that the IRAP may capture subtle changes in responding following a brief intervention (e.g., Hooper, Villatte, Neofotistou, & McHugh, 2010; Kishita, Muto, Ohtsuki, & Barnes-Holmes, 2014), making it well suited for the current study, which examined the effects of a particular environmental manipulation on self-esteem.
The current study
The aim of this study was to investigate the influence of an adverse interpersonal event (social exclusion) on state paranoia and self-esteem, and to assess the relationship between these two variables in this context by replicating previous research on this topic (e.g., Kesting et al., 2013) . It was hypothesized that exclusion would be associated with increased state paranoia and that this would be moderated by trait paranoia. That is, we anticipated that individuals with a history of responding to adverse experiences in a paranoid manner (i.e., paranoia-prone) would be more likely to do so in the current context. It was also hypothesized that changes in state paranoia following exclusion would be associated with changes in self-esteem. Specifically, we expected the adverse experience of exclusion to influence both self-esteem and paranoia, as well as to show a relationship between the two.
1 This study also tested if social exclusion would affect 'implicit' self-esteem. Recently, some studies have investigated implicit self-esteem within the context of paranoia using the IAT. This research typically examines discrepancies between self-reported and implicit self-esteem, and compares individuals with persecutory delusions with healthy and/or depressed controls (e.g., Kesting, Mehl, Rief, Lindenmeyer, & Lincoln, 2011; MacKinnon, Newman-Taylor, & Stopa, 2011; McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2007; Moritz, Werner, & von Collani, 2006) . Findings have been somewhat mixed however. The experimental approach adopted in this study may help to clarify some of these inconsistencies. Specifically, we hypothesized that exclusion would be associated with reduced self-esteem on the IAT and with increased 'Me-Negative' and 'Others-Negative' responding at the IRAP trial-type level. In light of evidence that positive self-evaluations may be maintained in paranoia (Kesting & Lincoln, 2013), we did not expect exclusion to influence responding on 'Me-Positive' IRAP relations.
Method

Participants
Ninety-seven volunteers (63 female, 31 male, 1 intersex, 2 nonbinary, Mean age ¼ 23.03, SD ¼ 8.83) participated. Most were NUI Galway undergraduate Psychology students, who took part for course credit. Other NUI Galway students were recruited via 1 While changes in self-esteem may precede or mediate changes in paranoia following social stress, from our perspective, the relationship between these variables is not invariably a straightforward causal one. From this point of view, events in the environment play an important role in influencing both levels of paranoia and self-esteem, as well as the relationship between the two (see Stewart, Stewart, & Hughes, 2016) . Thus, while in some contexts self-esteem may indeed show causal influence with respect to paranoia, in other contexts (e.g., during deliteralization exercises or given higher state or trait acceptance) it need not.
